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ABSTRACT
We posit that the effect of non-audit fees on audit quality is conditional
on auditor industry specialization. Industry specialist auditors are more likely
than nonspecialists to be concerned about reputation losses and litigation
exposure, and to benefit from knowledge spillovers from the provision of
non-audit services. We find evidence that audit quality measured by increased
propensity to issue going-concern opinion, increased propensity to miss ana-
lysts’ forecasts, as well as higher earnings-response coefficients increases with
the level of non-audit services acquired from industry specialist auditors com-
pared to nonspecialist auditors.
1. Introduction
In this study, we investigate whether the relation between the provision
of non-audit services and the impairment of auditor quality is conditional
on auditor specialization. We posit and provide evidence that impairment
of audit quality is contingent on auditor specialization—audit quality is
less likely to be impaired with the provision of non-audit services in the
case of specialists compared to nonspecialists. In doing so, we add to prior
research that documents mixed findings on the relation between non-
audit service provision and audit quality (e.g., Defond, Raghunandan, and
Subramanyam [2002], Frankel, Johnson, and Nelson [2002], Ashbaugh,
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Lafond, and Mayhew [2003], Krishnan, Sami, and Zhang [2005], Francis
and Ke [2006]) by showing that the effects of non-audit services on audit
quality are not readily apparent without also jointly accounting for the ef-
fects of auditor specialization.
Regulators’ concerns that the provision of non-audit services impairs au-
ditor independence (Levitt [1998], SEC [2000]) gave rise to several stud-
ies that examine whether the provision of non-audit services impairs audit
quality. These studies report seemingly conflicting results depending on the
proxy of audit quality used. For example, notwithstanding earlier evidence
by Frankel, Johnson, and Nelson [2002], recent evidence indicates that pro-
vision of non-audit services is not associated with the incidence of higher
discretionary accruals and the propensity to meet earnings benchmarks
(Ashbaugh, Lafond, and Mayhew [2003], Chung and Kallapur [2003]).
Similarly, there is no evidence of an association between the provision of
non-audit services and a reduced proclivity to issue going-concern opinions
for financially distressed firms (Defond, Raghunandan, and Subramanyam
[2002]). Kinney, Palmrose, and Scholz [2004] examine restatements of pre-
viously issued financial statements and find either no or negative association
between restatements and major classes of non-audit services, and a positive
association only for a small class of unspecified non-audit services (compris-
ing 4.6% of total fees in their sample). In contrast, Francis and Ke [2006]
document that market response to quarterly earnings surprises is signifi-
cantly lower for firms with higher (vs. lower) non-audit fees. Krishnan, Sami,
and Zhang [2005] also find a negative association between non-audit fees
and earnings response coefficients in each of the three quarters following
the proxy statement public disclosure of fee information.
We view higher discretionary accruals, greater (lower) propensity to meet
(miss) earnings benchmarks, lower propensity to issue going-concern opin-
ions, and higher incidence of restatements to be proxies for impairment
of auditor independence in fact. Discretionary accruals are subject to more
measurement error than the other measures (Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney
[1995], Defond, Raghunandan, and Subramanyam [2002], Kinney and
Libby [2002]). The strength of stock market responses to earnings surprises
due to non-audit fees proxies for the market’s perceptions of auditor in-
dependence in appearance. Given this assessment, one interpretation of
cumulative research to-date is that there is some evidence that provision of
non-audit services impairs independence in appearance, but has either a
weak or no effect on independence in fact.1
1 One possible interpretation is that the market has been systematically wrong in its responses
(in terms of earnings response coefficients) in that it may have overreacted in its responses
to the possibility of impairment of audit (and financial reporting) quality when in actual fact,
this is either not the case or is restricted to a small subset of firms/non-audit fee classes. Yet
another interpretation of prior studies that find no statistical association between non-audit
fees and various proxies for audit quality (going-concern opinions and discretionary accruals)
is that these proxies lack power (e.g., see Defond, Raghunandan, and Subramanyam [2002,
p. 1250]).
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Prior research indicates that the provision of non-audit services cre-
ates economic bonds that weaken an auditor’s independence, and there-
fore, audit quality (DeAngelo [1981], Simunic [1984], Beck, Frecka, and
Solomon [1988]). However, research also indicates that reputation con-
cerns (Benston [1975], Watts and Zimmerman [1983]), litigation exposure
(Palmrose [1988], Shu [2000]), and knowledge spillovers (Simunic [1984])
serve to counter incentives for auditors to lose independence and compro-
mise audit quality. If auditors are to maintain independence and preserve
audit quality even when they provide non-audit services, concerns about rep-
utation losses, litigation exposure, and knowledge spillover benefits must be
sufficient to overwhelm incentives arising from provision of non-audit ser-
vices. Prior studies (e.g., Defond, Raghunandan, and Subramanyam [2002])
use this argument to interpret the absence of an association between non-
audit service provision fees and audit quality. However, disentanglement of
the effects of non-audit service provision and other mitigating factors (rep-
utation concerns, litigation exposure, and knowledge spillover) requires
separate measurement or proxies for these mitigating factors.
We follow prior literature that argues auditors/audit firms that special-
ize in particular industries build expertise in these specific areas and make
greater specific investments in building up a reputation of good quality.
We posit that concerns about reputation and litigation exposure, as well as
benefits from knowledge spillover, are heightened with auditor industry spe-
cialization (O’Keefe, Kin, and Gaver [1994], Craswell, Francis, and Taylor
[1995], Solomon, Shields, and Whittington [1999], Owhoso, Messier, and
Lynch [2002], Carcello and Nagy [2004]). More specifically, we posit that the
association between provision of non-audit services and impairment of audi-
tor quality is moderated by auditor industry specialization, and that failure to
account for this moderating role of auditor industry specialization can mask
the relation between the provision of non-audit services and auditor quality.
Empirical measures for our theoretical constructs—audit quality, non-
audit fees, and auditor specialization—can be noisy, and there is little con-
sensus on the most appropriate proxy. Hence, we conduct our empirical
tests using multiple proxies of audit quality that are used by prior studies.
We infer improved audit quality from: (1) a higher propensity for audi-
tors to issue a going-concern opinion to financially distressed firms, (2) a
lower level of discretionary current accruals associated with the firm, (3) a
reduced (heightened) propensity for firms to just meet (miss) analyst fore-
casts, and (d) a stronger market response to quarterly earnings surprises
(i.e., earnings-returns coefficients [ERCs]). The first three measures proxy
for actual (as apposed to perceived) audit quality, while the last measure
proxies for investors’ perception of audit quality.
We proxy auditor industry specialization based on the market share
of the Big 5 auditors, and test the sensitivity of our results using other
operationalizations of market share. We proxy the economic bond with
the client created through the provision of non-audit services both by the
magnitude of the non-audit fee and by client importance, measured in terms
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of non-audit fees provided to the client relative to the firm’s other clients. To
provide a more complete coverage of the total economic bonding between
auditor and client, we also include total fees that include both audit and
non-audit fees.2
Our results provide some evidence that audit quality is higher when clients
purchase more non-audit services from industry specialists. For our first
proxy of audit quality, going-concern opinions, we use a sample of 1,692
financially distressed firm-year observations for the period 2000–2001. We
find that, consistent with Defond, Raghunandan, and Subramanyam [2002],
the provision of non-audit services (measured using the natural log of non-
audit fees and percentile rank of a client’s non-audit fees) is not associated
with a reduced propensity to issue going-concern opinions. However, we find
a positive association between the issuance of going-concern opinions and
the natural log of total fees. More importantly, all three fee measures interact
significantly with audit specialization in explaining auditors’ propensity to
issue going-concern opinions. Specifically, we find that an increased level of
non-audit services is positively and significantly associated (not associated)
with the incidence of going-concern opinions issued for clients audited by
specialists (nonspecialists), suggesting that audit specialists are more likely
than nonspecialists to issue going-concern opinions to financially distressed
firms when they provide non-audit services.
For our second proxy of audit quality relating to discretionary current
accruals, we detect weak or no association between provision of non-audit
services and the absolute level of discretionary current accruals for our sam-
ple of 4,943 firm-year observations for the 2000–2001 period, consistent
with findings by Frankel, Johnson, and Nelson [2002], Ashbaugh, Lafond,
and Mayhew [2003], and Chung and Kallapur [2003]. Unlike the going-
concern analysis, we find that auditor specialization does not moderate the
relation between provision of non-audit services and (signed and unsigned)
discretionary current accruals.
Our third proxy of audit quality relates to firms’ propensity to meet or
avoid missing analysts’ forecasts. We analyze a sample of 3,498 firm-year
observations from 2000 to 2001, and find that non-audit fees are not as-
sociated with firms’ propensity to just meet analysts’ forecasts (coded as
the tendency for actual earnings minus analysts’ forecasts to be within zero
to positive one cent). By comparison, prior research either finds no such
association (Ashbaugh, Lafond, and Mayhew [2002]) or finds a positive as-
sociation (Frankel, Johnson, and Nelson [2002]). We find no interaction
between the provision of non-audit services and industry specialization for
firms’ propensity to just meet analysts’ forecasts. In contrast, we find that
firms’ propensity to avoid missing analysts’ forecasts (coded as the tendency
for actual earnings minus analysts’ forecasts to be within negative two cents)
2 For brevity, we refer to all three measures as proxies for non-audit fees, although total fees
(which include non-audit fees) are more related to total economic bonding.
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is negatively associated with the provision of non-audit services as proxied
by percentile rank of a client’s non-audit fees (but not with the other two fee
measures). For all three fee measures, we find that compared to specialist
auditors, clients audited by nonspecialists are less likely to just miss analysts’
forecasts when the public accounting firms provide non-audit services. Fi-
nally, in terms of the market’s reaction to earnings surprises, we find that
ERCs for a set of 2,935 firm-year observations during the period 2000–2001
are significantly lower for firms that purchase non-audit services (using all
three fee measures) from non-audit specialists relative to firms that do so
from audit specialists.
Our paper contributes to the literature on the effect of non-audit ser-
vice provision on audit quality by providing the first empirical evidence that
this effect is conditional on auditor specialization. Prior research presents
seemingly conflicting results on the effects of non-audit service provision on
actual audit quality (e.g., no effects on going-concern opinions, negative ef-
fects on propensity to avoid missing analysts’ forecasts) and perceived audit
quality (effects on ERCs). We provide triangulation with prior research find-
ings by examining multiple proxies of audit quality in the same study. Across
a variety of audit quality proxies, we generally obtain consistent evidence
that specialists provide higher audit quality as non-audit services increase
while nonspecialist auditors provide lower audit quality as non-audit fees
increase. Our results suggest the important role of auditor specialization in
addressing the regulatory and academic communities’ concerns about the
appropriateness of accounting firms providing non-audit services.
Our study also contributes to the literature on auditor industry special-
ization. Prior studies (e.g., Krishnan [2003], Balsam, Krishnan, and Yang
[2003]) generally show that audit quality, as measured by ERCs and discre-
tionary accruals, is higher for firms audited by specialists. There have not
been any studies that examine the association between audit specialization
and audit quality proxied by going-concern opinions and the propensity to
meet or miss analysts’ forecasts, nor the interaction between industry special-
ization and the provision of non-audit services in determining audit quality.
Our results show that industry specialization interacts with the provision of
non-audit services in influencing audit quality in terms of going-concern
opinions, the propensity to avoid missing analysts’ forecasts, and ERCs.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We discuss prior lit-
erature and develop our hypotheses in section 2. We present our research
design, including the sample characteristics, in section 3, and report empir-
ical results in section 4. We offer some concluding remarks in section 5.
2. Background and Hypothesis Development
Following regulators’ concern about the lack of auditor independence
through the provision of non-audit services (e.g., Levitt [1998]), the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission (SEC) revised auditors’ independence rules
in 2000, narrowing the scope of non-audit services and requiring disclosure
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of both audit fees and fees derived from different components of non-audit
services (SEC [2000]). The Sarbanes Oxley Act passed in 2002 went a step
further, and effectively banned auditors from performing certain types of
non-audit services. The assumption made by regulators is that the provi-
sion of non-audit services impairs auditor independence both in fact and in
appearance.
Research indicates that auditors’ provision of non-audit services creates
economic bonds on the auditor and may potentially cause the auditor to be
financially reliant on the client (DeAngelo [1981], Simunic [1984], Beck,
Frecka, and Solomon [1988]) and lose objectivity. In addition, auditors may
be less objective when they audit operations or transactions that they (or
members of the certified public accounting firm) had previously provided
advice on (Plumlee [1985]). However, prior research also indicates that
several factors counter these incentives that dilute auditors’ objectivity—
reputation concerns (Benston [1975], Watts and Zimmerman [1983]), liti-
gation exposure (Palmrose [1988], Shu [2000]), and knowledge spillovers
(Simunic [1984], Beck, Frecka, and Solomon. [1988]). Whether auditors’
independence and audit quality are impaired when they provide non-audit
services is a function of the net balance of the economic dependency arising
from non-audit service provision, and the mitigating factors that promote
auditor independence. However, without a proxy for these mitigating fac-
tors, it is difficult to disentangle their effects.
In this study, we attempt to measure and disentangle some of these factors
that have been discussed in the literature on non-audit services and audi-
tor independence. We posit that the effects of these mitigating factors are
magnified with auditor specialization. Auditors with industry specializations
who make investments in developing a reputation for performing audits
in particular industries are particularly concerned about preserving their
reputational capital, and avoiding reputation damage through litigation ex-
posure. Similarly, at the firm level, audit firms that make strategic choices
and invest organizational resources in developing intellectual capital in par-
ticular industries likely have greater concerns about reputation preserva-
tion, and are less likely to cave in to client pressures and lose objectivity.
Consistent with this argument, prior research shows that industry-specialist
auditors are more likely to comply with auditing standards (O’Keefe, Kin,
and Gaver [1994]), and have clients that are less likely to be associated with
SEC enforcement actions (Carcello and Nagy [2004]), lower discretionary
accruals, and higher ERCs (Balsam, Krishnan, and Yang [2003], Krishnan
[2003]).
In addition, knowledge spillover, the incremental knowledge generated
from providing non-audit services (Simunic [1984], Beck, Frecka, and
Solomon [1988]), is also likely associated with auditor specialization.3 In
3 Simunic [1984] and Beck, Frecka, and Solomon [1988] argue that knowledge that auditors
acquire while performing non-audit services can transfer to the performance of an audit and
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recent years, audit firms have moved to a business-risk audit methodology
(Bell, Peecher, and Solomon [2005]) centered on understanding of the
client’s risk and operations. Knowledge spillover from provision of non-audit
services can enhance the auditor’s understanding of the client and its risks.
Prior research shows that auditors with industry specialization have supe-
rior knowledge and performance relative to nonspecialists (e.g., Solomon,
Shields, and Whittington [1999], Owhoso, Messier, and Lynch [2002]). This
suggests that industry-specialist auditors (vs. non–industry specialist audi-
tors) have the background knowledge both to more effectively perform the
non-audit services of a client from a specialized industry and to acquire and
leverage on the knowledge spillover from performing non-audit services to
perform a more effective and efficient audit.4 Finally, auditor expertise aris-
ing from industry specialization can improve audit quality, in and of itself.
Ceteris paribus, two auditors may have similar incentives to meet clients’
preferences, but the overall quality of the auditor with greater industry spe-
cialization will still be higher than the one without.
In summary, our discussion above suggests that the provision of non-audit
services is less likely to impair audit quality of industry specialists than non–
industry specialists. We test the following hypothesis (stated in alternative
form):
H1: The association between the level of non-audit services and audit
quality is conditional on whether or not the audit firm is an industry
specialist.
This hypothesis is tested using four proxies for audit quality: going-
concern opinions, discretionary current accruals, the propensity to meet
(avoid missing) analysts’ forecasts, and the ERC.
3. Data and Research Design
3.1 SAMPLE
Our initial sample consists of 9,501 firm-years with fee data available from
the Compustat database for fiscal years 2000–2001. We do not include year
2002 because that year is associated both with the demise of Arthur Andersen
and the effective banning of auditors from performing various kinds of non-
audit services by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. These two events may have undue
thus generate production efficiencies. A caveat to this knowledge spillover effect is that tests of
this effect yield mixed results (see discussion by Solomon [1990]). In fact, using internal billing
data from a public accounting firm, Davis, Ricchiute, and Trompeter [1993] provide evidence
that questions the knowledge spillover argument. However, consistent with our arguments in
this paper, it is possible that knowledge spillover effects are more apparent for specialist auditors
because these specialist auditors can better leverage on their expertise (Solomon, Shields, and
Whittington [1999]) to generate these production efficiencies.
4 Note that, unlike the reputation preservation factor, the knowledge-spillover and expertise
effects are more directly related to enhancement of audit quality, and less with the motivation
to withstand client pressure.
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influences on the firms, and the audit and stock market during that year.5
We restrict our study to clients of Big 5 auditors to control for brand name
(Craswell, Francis, and Taylor [1995], Chung and Kallapur [2003]). Accord-
ingly, we remove 1,269 observations that are not audited by Big 5 auditors.6
We further remove 1,852 financial firms (Standard Industrial Classification
[SIC] codes 6000–6999), leaving a remaining sample of 6,380 firm-year ob-
servations. We winsorize each of the continuous control variables used in the
regression at the top and bottom 1% to remove extreme values. For our first
proxy of audit quality, going-concern opinions, we select those firms that
are subject to financial difficulties. Following prior studies (e.g., Reynolds
and Francis [2000], Defond, Raghunandan, and Subramanyam [2002]),
we define financially distressed firms to be firms that report either nega-
tive earnings or operating cash flows during the current fiscal year. There
are a total of 1,692 firm-years that meet these criteria and have all available
financial information for the control variables used in the going-concern
opinion study. Of these firm-year observations, a total of 120 firms receive
going-concern opinions for the first time during 2000–2001.7
For the discretionary accruals test, a total of 4,943 firm-years are available
with all necessary financial information in Compustat. For the analysts’ fore-
casts benchmark test, we obtain analyst data from I/B/E/S detailed files,
of which a total of 3,498 firm-years with complete information are avail-
able. Finally, for the earnings-returns regression test, we have 2,935 firm-
year observations with complete information from Compustat, I/B/E/S de-
tailed files, and the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) databases.
Table 1, panels A and B report the distribution of sample firms by year and
industry, respectively, for the four sets of data used for the going-concern
opinion, discretionary current accruals, analysts’ forecasts benchmark, and
earnings-returns regression tests.
3.2 NON-AUDIT FEES
Following prior studies (e.g., Defond, Raghunandan, and Subramanyam
[2002], Chung and Kallapur [2003]), we use the following three measures
to capture the economic bonding between the clients and auditor through
the provision of non-audit services: (1) the natural log of non-audit fees
(LNAU ), which captures the level of economic bonding resulting from the
5 For instance, clients may deliberately reduce the purchase of non-audit services simply to
avoid attracting public and regulatory attention. In addition, we find a big decrease in fee ratio
in 2002: the mean (median) fee ratio is 0.52 (0.54) for the year 2000, 0.45 (0.45) for the year
2001, and 0.28 (0.26) for the year 2002.
6 The Big 5 public accounting firms command a premium in audit fees compared to the
other smaller firms. Of the 1,269 firms not audited by Big 5 auditors, only 650 firms have their
auditors’ names identified in Compustat, of which two-thirds are audited by BDO Seidman and
Grant Thornton. We re-run our analyses with these firms, and our results remain unchanged.
7 Compustat does not provide the nature of the modified opinion. Hence, we hand collect
the going-concern opinions from firms’ annual reports stored in the SEC Edgar database.
NON-AUDIT SERVICE FEES AND AUDIT QUALITY 207
T
A
B
L
E
1
Sa
m
pl
e
Si
ze
an
d
In
du
st
ry
D
es
cr
ip
tio
n
P
an
el
A
:D
is
tr
ib
ut
io
n
of
sa
m
pl
e
fi
rm
s
by
ye
ar
O
pi
ni
on
M
od
el
A
cc
ru
al
s
M
od
el
A
na
ly
st
s’
Fo
re
ca
st
M
od
el
E
R
C
M
od
el
YE
A
R
N
Pe
rc
en
t
N
Pe
rc
en
t
N
Pe
rc
en
t
N
Pe
rc
en
t
20
00
64
9
38
.3
6
2,
02
7
41
.0
0
1,
53
5
43
.8
8
1,
21
9
41
.5
3
20
01
1,
04
3
61
.6
4
2,
91
6
59
.0
0
1,
96
3
56
.1
2
1,
71
6
58
.4
7
To
ta
l
1,
69
2
10
0.
00
4,
94
3
10
0.
00
3,
49
8
10
0.
00
2,
93
5
10
0.
00
P
an
el
B
:D
is
tr
ib
ut
io
n
of
sa
m
pl
e
fi
rm
s
by
in
du
st
ry
O
pi
ni
on
M
od
el
A
cc
ru
al
s
M
od
el
A
na
ly
st
s’
Fo
re
ca
st
M
od
el
E
R
C
M
od
el
SI
C
N
Pe
rc
en
t
N
Pe
rc
en
t
N
Pe
rc
en
t
N
Pe
rc
en
t
73
B
us
in
es
s
se
rv
ic
es
,i
nc
lu
di
ng
so
ft
w
ar
e
47
4
28
.0
1
97
9
19
.8
1
60
2
17
.2
1
36
9
12
.5
7
28
C
he
m
ic
al
an
d
al
lie
d
pr
od
uc
ts
26
2
15
.4
8
58
1
11
.7
5
36
6
10
.4
6
29
1
9.
91
36
E
le
ct
ro
ni
c/
ot
he
r
el
ec
tr
ic
eq
ui
pm
en
t
22
4
13
.2
4
51
2
10
.3
6
33
7
9.
63
29
6
10
.0
9
35
In
du
st
ri
al
m
ac
hi
ne
ry
/e
qu
ip
m
en
t
12
5
7.
39
38
6
7.
81
25
0
7.
15
21
0
7.
16
38
In
st
ru
m
en
ts
an
d
re
la
te
d
pr
od
uc
ts
15
9
9.
40
33
6
6.
80
27
5
7.
86
23
0
7.
84
48
C
om
m
un
ic
at
io
ns
86
5.
08
21
2
4.
29
11
3
3.
23
89
3.
03
13
O
il
an
d
ga
s
ex
tr
ac
tio
n
20
1.
18
18
0
3.
64
10
7
3.
06
10
3
3.
51
87
E
ng
in
ee
ri
ng
,a
cc
ou
nt
in
g,
re
se
ar
ch
,m
an
ag
em
en
t,
an
d
re
la
te
d
se
rv
ic
es
59
3.
49
15
0
3.
03
93
2.
66
74
2.
52
49
E
le
ct
ri
c/
ga
s/
sa
ni
ta
ry
se
rv
ic
es
9
0.
53
14
7
2.
97
84
2.
40
15
7
5.
35
20
Fo
od
an
d
ki
nd
re
d
pr
od
uc
ts
12
0.
71
12
8
2.
59
66
1.
89
64
2.
18
50
D
ur
ab
le
go
od
s—
w
ho
le
sa
le
38
2.
25
12
5
2.
53
61
1.
74
56
1.
91
37
Tr
an
sp
or
ta
tio
n
eq
ui
pm
en
t
23
1.
36
12
4
2.
51
88
2.
52
85
2.
90
59
M
is
ce
lla
ne
ou
s
re
ta
il
28
1.
65
12
1
2.
45
80
2.
29
58
1.
98
O
th
er
s
(4
5
in
du
st
ri
es
)
17
3
10
.2
2
96
2
19
.4
6
97
6
27
.9
0
85
3
29
.0
5
To
ta
l
1,
69
2
10
0.
00
4,
94
3
10
0.
00
3,
49
8
10
0.
00
2,
93
5
10
0.
00
T
he
sa
m
pl
e
pe
ri
od
is
fis
ca
l
ye
ar
s
20
00
–2
00
1,
an
d
co
ns
is
ts
of
no
nfi
na
nc
ia
l
fir
m
s
au
di
te
d
by
B
ig
5
pu
bl
ic
ac
co
un
tin
g
fir
m
s.
Fo
r
th
e
go
in
g-
co
nc
er
n
op
in
io
n
st
ud
y,
th
e
sa
m
pl
e
co
ns
is
ts
of
1,
69
2
fin
an
ci
al
ly
di
st
re
ss
ed
fir
m
s
th
at
re
po
rt
ei
th
er
ne
ga
tiv
e
ea
rn
in
gs
or
op
er
at
in
g
ca
sh
fl
ow
s
du
ri
ng
th
e
cu
rr
en
tfi
sc
al
ye
ar
ov
er
th
e
pe
ri
od
20
00
–2
00
1.
O
ft
he
se
fir
m
-y
ea
r
ob
se
rv
at
io
ns
,a
to
ta
lo
f1
20
fir
m
sr
ec
ei
ve
go
in
g-
co
nc
er
n
op
in
io
n
fo
r
th
e
fir
st
tim
e
du
ri
ng
th
e
sa
m
pl
e
pe
ri
od
.F
or
th
e
ac
cr
ua
ls
m
od
el
,t
he
sa
m
pl
e
co
ns
is
ts
of
4,
94
3
fir
m
-y
ea
r
ob
se
rv
at
io
ns
fo
r
th
e
pe
ri
od
20
00
–2
00
1
th
at
ha
ve
co
m
pl
et
e
fin
an
ci
al
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
in
th
e
C
om
pu
st
at
da
ta
ba
se
.A
to
ta
lo
f
3,
49
8
fir
m
-y
ea
r
ob
se
rv
at
io
ns
is
av
ai
la
bl
e
fo
r
th
e
an
al
ys
ts
’
fo
re
ca
st
m
od
el
fo
r
th
e
pe
ri
od
20
00
–2
00
1.
A
na
ly
st
fo
re
ca
st
da
ta
ar
e
fr
om
th
e
de
ta
ile
d
I/
B
/E
/S
fil
e.
T
he
sa
m
pl
e
fo
r
th
e
ea
rn
in
gs
-r
et
ur
ns
re
gr
es
si
on
m
od
el
is
2,
93
5
fir
m
-y
ea
r
ob
se
rv
at
io
ns
,w
ith
al
l
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
av
ai
la
bl
e
fr
om
C
om
pu
st
at
,I
/B
/E
/S
de
ta
ile
d
fil
es
,a
nd
C
R
SP
.
208 C.-Y. LIM AND H.-T. TAN
purchase of non-audit services; (2) the percentile rank of a particular client’s
non-audit fees given all total fees received by the audit firm (PRNAU ), which
captures the relative significance of client non-audit fees to the total fees rev-
enue received by the auditor;8 and (3) the natural log of total fees (LTOT),
which captures the total economic bonding of the client to the auditor
created by the provision of both non-audit and audit services.9
3.3 AUDITOR INDUSTRY SPECIALIZATION
We use client sales to estimate industry market share of the Big 5 auditors
(Krishnan [2003], Balsam, Krishnan, and Yang [2003], Dunn and Mayhew
[2004]), defined as follows:10
ADTR MSik =
J ik∑
j=1
SALESijk
Ik∑
i=1
J ik∑
j=1
SALESijk
(1)
For brevity, we do not denote the subscript denoting a specific year. The
variable SALES denotes the client’s sales revenue. The numerator is the
sum of the sales of all Jik clients (reported in Compustat) of Big 5 audit
firm i in industry k. The denominator in equation (1) is the sales of all Jik
clients in industry k reported in Compustat, summed over all Ik audit firms
(including both Big 5 firms and other audit firms auditing in the industry).
To estimate industry market share for the Big 5 auditors in a given industry
for a particular year, we require a minimum of 20 clients in the industry
(using the two-digit SIC classification).
Consistent with prior literature (Lys and Watts [1994], Chung and
Kallapur [2003]), we define the auditor with the largest industry market
share (SPEC) as the specialist.11 As a robustness check, we also use another
8 Chung and Kallapur [2003] use client importance measured by non-audit fees relative to
total revenue received by the auditor. However, the measure for client importance is highly
skewed and non-normal (skewness = 55.89; kurtosis = 3338) for the overall sample. Hence, we
transform it using ranks, such that firms are assigned a rank of 1 (100) for those in the lowest
(highest) percentile (skewness = −0.06, kurtosis = −1.16).
9 Prior research indicates that audit and non-audit fee are jointly determined (Whisenant,
Sankaraguruswamy, and Raghunandan [2003]). To assess whether audit fees affect the associa-
tion between non-audit fees and audit quality, we reanalyze our results by including audit fees
as an additional control variable (along with LNAU and PRNAU , but not LTOT). We obtain
similar results with our main analyses for all tests with the exception that for the ERC test, the
fee by specialization interaction is no longer significant when fee is measured by LNAU (p =
0.16). This nonresult is likely driven by the significant positive correlation between audit and
non-audit fees (correlation coefficient = 0.75).
10 We do not use the actual audit fees to compute market share of each auditor because the
Compustat database provides audit fees details for only 50% of all the listed firms.
11 We also measure SPEC using the number of clients as the base. Using number of clients
as the base avoids the bias toward larger clients that is implied by using sales as the base. Our
results are similar with this alternative measure.
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three alternative measures of audit specialization: (1) we measure industry
specialization using a continuous measure of market share, (2) we define an
auditor to be a specialist when it has the largest market share and its market
share is at least 10% higher than the second largest auditor (e.g., Mayhew
and Wilkins [2003]), and (3) we designate any auditor with a market share
of 24% or more as a specialist (e.g., Neal and Riley [2004]).12 We obtain
similar results as our main analyses using the first two alternative measures of
specialization. For the last measure (market share cutoff of 24%), we obtain
similar results as our main analyses for the various measures of audit quality
with the following exceptions: for the going-concern measure, significant
effects are obtained only when fees are measured using LNAU , and for the
propensity to avoid missing test, significant effects are obtained only when
fees are measured using PRNAU .13 In the interest of parsimony, we only
report results based on SPEC .
4. Research Design and Empirical Results
4.1 GOING-CONCERN OPINIONS
4.1.1. Empirical Model. To test the association between non-audit fees
and going-concern opinion, we estimate the following logistic regression
model:
OPIN = βo + β1FEE + β2ZSCORE + β3BETA + β4RETURN + β5VOL
+ β6LEV + β7CLEV + β8LLOSS + β9OCF + β10REPLAG
+ β11ASSET + β12INVM + β13AGE + β14FFIN + β15SPEC
+ β16Y00 + β17FEE ∗ SPEC + e (2)
where
OPIN = 1 if the firm receives a going-concern opinion, and 0 otherwise;
FEE = fee metrics, LNAU , PRNAU , and LTOT , as defined earlier;
ZSCORE = Altman’s [1968] Z -score reported by Compustat; it is coded 2
if the score is less than 1.81, 1 if the score is between 1.81 and
3, and 0 if the score is more than 3;14
BETA = systematic risk over the fiscal year;
12 Following Neal and Riley [2004], the appropriate cutoff for the market share is given by
(1/N )∗1.2. Hence, when N = 5, an auditor holding more than 24% market share is considered
as a specialist.
13 In particular, the consistency of our results using SPEC and the continuous measure
provides assurance that our results are not driven by some arbitrary cutoff point in identifying
specialists versus nonspecialists.
14 We do not use the bankruptcy score based on Zmijewski [1984] because the distribution
of that variable is not normal (skewness = −7.43, kurtosis = 141.63). Instead, we use the Altman
[1968] Z -score provided by Compustat, which has a normal distribution (skewness = −0.16,
kurtosis = −1.98).
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RETURN = the firm’s stock return over the fiscal year;
VOL = the variance of the residual from the market model over the
fiscal year;
LEV = debt-to-capital ratio;
CLEV = change in LEV during the year;
LLOSS = 1 if the firm reports a loss for the previous year, and 0
otherwise;
OCF = operating cash flows divided by total assets at fiscal year-end;
REPLAG = number of days between the fiscal year-end and earnings an-
nouncement date;
ASSET = natural log of total assets at fiscal year-end;
INVM = cash, cash equivalents, and short- and long-term investment
securities deflated by total assets at fiscal year-end;
AGE = natural log of the number of years since the company was listed
on a stock exchange;
FFIN = an indicator variable, equals 1 when the firm issues equity or
debt in the following year;
SPEC = 1 if the auditor has the largest market share in the industry,
and 0 otherwise;
Y 00 = year dummy.
To enable comparability with Defond, Raghunandan, and Subramanyam
[2002], we use a set of control variables (listed above) that is similar to those
used in their study.
4.1.2. Empirical Results. Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the
going-concern opinion results. Twenty-six percent of the financially dis-
tressed firms are audited by specialist auditors. Additionally, about 7% of
these financially distressed firms receive a going-concern opinion from the
auditors, which is comparable with that reported in prior studies (Defond,
Raghunandan, and Subramanyam [2002] and Reynolds and Francis [2000]
report values of 9% and 8%, respectively). We also compare the fees between
firms audited by specialists and nonspecialists. LNAU and LTOT (but not
PRNAU ) are significantly greater for firms audited by specialists than those
audited by nonspecialists. This finding is consistent with specialist auditors
being able to provide higher-quality non-audit (and audit) services because
of their superior expertise, and clients’ preference for specialist auditors
to perform non-audit services. The descriptive statistics for other control
variables and the correlation coefficients are reported in panels A and B of
table 2, respectively.
We report the results of the logistic regression in table 3. For each inde-
pendent variable, we report the regression coefficient, followed by the Wald
statistic in parentheses, and the marginal effect (in percent) in the square
brackets. The marginal effect indicates the change in the probability of a
firm receiving a going-concern opinion per standard deviation change in
each respective independent variable (holding other independent variables
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constant), given a base-rate probability of 7% of receiving a going-concern
opinion.15
In a model with SPEC alone (without fee measures), the coefficient es-
timate for SPEC is positive but insignificant. In a model with fee mea-
sures alone (without SPEC), consistent with Defond, Raghunandan, and
Subramanyam’s [2002] finding of no association between the provision of
non-audit services and going-concern opinion, we find that LNAU and
PRNAU are not associated with OPIN . However, in contrast to Defond,
Raghunandan, and Subramanyam [2002], we find that LTOT is positively
and significantly associated with OPIN . For the set of control variables, our
results indicate that firms with higher bankruptcy risk, leverage, stock return
volatility, poor stock market performance, losses in prior years, and smaller
assets, as well as poor operating cash flow and liquidity, are more likely to
receive going-concern opinions.
We next examine the interaction effect between the fee metrics and audi-
tor specialization on OPIN . The coefficient for FEE ∗ SPEC (β 17) shows the
incremental effect of FEE on OPIN when a firm is audited by a specialist
rather than a nonspecialist auditor. We expect this coefficient to be positive
based on our hypothesis. Consistent with our prediction, the coefficient es-
timate for FEE ∗ SPEC is positive and statistically significant for all the three
fee variables, which suggests that firms audited by audit specialists are more
likely to receive going-concern opinions when non-audit services increase.
The impact of considering this interaction is nontrivial. The marginal effect
associated with this interaction effect (see table 3) indicates that, depending
on the fee proxy, every standard deviation change in FEE ∗ SPEC increases a
firm’s likelihood of receiving a going-concern opinion by 2.97% to 17.41%
(i.e., the likelihood increases from 7% to a range of 10% to 24% depending
on the fee metric used).
To assess the nature of the interaction, we further analyze the coefficient
of FEE (β1), which represents the effect of non-audit fees on the issuance
of going-concern opinions when firms are audited by nonspecialists (i.e.,
when SPEC is coded zero). To the extent that non-audit services provided
by nonspecialists impair auditor independence, we expect these auditors
to be less likely to issue going-concern reports for the financially distressed
firms, implying a negative β 1. The coefficient estimate for FEE is not statisti-
cally significant across all three measures of fees. The sum of the coefficients
of FEE + FEE ∗ SPEC (β 1 + β 17) represents the effect of FEE on OPIN when
firms are audited by specialists. If specialist auditors provide high-quality au-
dits, we expect the sum of the coefficients of (β 1 + β 17) to be non-negative
(in contrast to a negative association in the case of nonspecialists). We use
chi-square statistics to test whether the sum of the two regression coefficients
15 The marginal effect per standard deviation (SD) change for a variable is computed as p ×
(1 − p) × β × SD, where p is the base rate (0.07) and β is the estimated coefficient from the
logistic regression (Liao [1994]).
214 C.-Y. LIM AND H.-T. TAN
differs from zero. The results in table 3 indicate that the sum of these coef-
ficients is positive and statistically significant at either 1% or 5% for all our
three fee variables.
As a robustness check, we use an alternative definition for financially
distressed firms. Following previous studies (McKeown, Mutchler, and
Hopwood [1991], Geiger and Rama [2003]), we classify a company as being
in financial stress if at least one of the following financial stress signals is met:
negative working capital at the end of the fiscal year, negative retained earn-
ings at the end of the fiscal year, or loss for the fiscal year. There are 2,071
firms that meet the criteria. The unreported results using this alternative
definition do not vary with those reported in table 3.
Overall, there is evidence that specialist auditors, but not nonspecialists,
are more likely to issue qualified going-concern opinions when they receive
higher non-audit fees from clients. To the extent that a greater propensity to
issue qualified going-concern opinions to financially distressed firms is asso-
ciated with higher audit quality, this result implies that specialists are more
likely than nonspecialists to provide higher quality audits with increased
provision of non-audit services to clients.
4.2 DISCRETIONARY CURRENT ACCRUALS
4.2.1. Empirical Model. Following Ashbaugh, Lafond, and Mayhew
[2003], we compute performance-adjusted discretionary current accruals
based on the cross-sectional modified Jones [1991] model for all firms
recorded in Compustat. We define current accruals (CA) as income before
extraordinary items plus depreciation and amortization minus operating
cash flows. To obtain the discretionary current accruals (DCA) in a given
year, we regress the following:
CAi,t
TAi,t−1
= λ1
(
1
TAi,t−1
)
+ λ2
(
REV i,t
TAi,t−1
)
+ λ3
(
IBi,t−1
TAi,t−1
)
+ εi,t (3)
where CAi,t is the current accruals for firm i in fiscal year t, TAi,t−1 is the
total assets for firm i in fiscal year t−1, REVi,t measures the change in
revenues for firm i in year t less revenues in t−1, IBt −1 is the income before
extraordinary items in year t−1, and ε i,t is the random residual term. Similar
to previous studies, we estimate equation (3) cross-sectionally on all firms
recorded in Compustat with the same two-digit SIC industry code. DCA are
then estimated as:
DCAi,t =
(
CAi,t
TAi,t−1
)
− λˆ1
(
1
TAi,t−1
)
− λˆ2
(
(REV − TR)i,t
TAi,t−1
)
− λˆ3
(
IBt−1
TAt−1
)
(4)
where λˆi is the estimated parameters from equation (3) and TRi,t is the
change in trade receivables for firm i in year t less the trade receivables in
the previous year.
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Consistent with Frankel, Johnson, and Nelson [2002] and Ashbaugh,
Lafond, and Mayhew [2003], we run the following model to test the as-
sociation between non-audit fees and discretionary current accruals:
ADCA = ω0 + ω1FEE + ω2TENU + ω3CFO + ϕ4LEV + ω5LITIG + ω6MB
+ ω7MV + ω8LOSS + ω9FIN + ω10LCA + ω11SPEC + ω12Y00
+ ω13FEE ∗ SPEC + ε (5)
where
ADCA = absolute value of discretionary current accruals estimated with
lagged return on assets (ROA) in the cross-sectional Jones [1991]
model;
FEE = fee metrics, LNAU , PRNAU , and LTOT , as defined earlier;
TENU = number of years that the auditor has audited the firm’s financial
statements;
CFO = cash flow from operations scaled by total assets at the beginning
of the fiscal year;
LEV = debt-to-capital ratio;
LITIG = 1 if the firm operates in a high-litigation industry, and 0 otherwise;
high-litigation industries are industries with SIC codes 2833–2836,
3570–3577, 3600–3674, 5200–5961, and 7370–7374;
MB = market-to-book ratio;
MV = natural log of market value;
LOSS = 1 if a firm reports a loss, and 0 otherwise;
FIN = 1 if the firm issued securities or acquired another company, and 0
otherwise;
LCA = lag of absolute current accruals in the previous year;
SPEC = 1 if the auditor has the largest market share in the industry, and 0
otherwise;
Y 00 = year dummy.
4.2.2. Empirical Results. We report the descriptive statistics and the corre-
lation coefficients for the fee metrics and variables used in the discretionary
current accruals model in table 4. The mean (median) absolute value for
discretionary current accruals (ADCA) is 0.13 (0.08). On average, 27% of the
firms are audited by industry specialists. All the three fee variables are signif-
icantly higher for firms audited by specialists than nonspecialists.
We report the regression results for the absolute discretionary current
accruals in table 5, panel A. The adjusted R2 is around 16%, compared
to the adjusted R2 of 18% to 21% reported in Ashbaugh, Lafond, and
Mayhew [2003]. In a model with SPEC alone (without fee measures), we
find no significant association between ADCA and SPEC . In contrast, Krish-
nan [2003] and Balsam, Krishnan, and Yang [2003] document a negative
relation between auditor industry specialization and absolute discretionary
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accruals. In a model with fee measures alone (without SPEC), we find that
ADCA is positively and significantly associated with LNAU , but not with
PRNAU and LTOT . Prior studies document either a positive or no associa-
tion between ADCA and non-audit fees, depending on the measure of non-
audit fees used (Frankel, Johnson, and Nelson [2002], Ashbaugh, Lafond,
and Mayhew [2003], Chung and Kallapur [2003]). Contrary to our predic-
tion in H1, the coefficient estimate for the interaction term (FEE ∗ SPEC)
is not statistically significant for all three measures of fee variables. We do
observe that when fees are proxied by LNAU , the sum of the coefficients
FEE + FEE ∗ SPEC (ω1 + ω13) is positive and significant at the 5% level, sug-
gesting that firms audited by specialists are associated with higher absolute
levels of discretionary current accruals as non-audit fees increase. As shown
below, this association is primarily driven by negative discretionary accruals.
We next partition the sample based on the sign of discretionary accruals
and report the results for positive and negative discretionary accruals in
table 5, panels B and C, respectively. We find no association between SPEC
and signed discretionary accrual measures in models that contain SPEC but
without the fee measures. In a model with fee alone (without SPEC), only
LTOT (but not LNAU and PRNAU ) is negatively and significantly associ-
ated with positive (or income increasing) discretionary current accruals. In
contrast, all three fee variables are negatively and significantly associated
with negative (or income decreasing) discretionary current accruals; that
is, firms report more income-decreasing accruals as fees increase. For both
signed discretionary accrual measures, estimates for the interaction term
(FEE ∗ SPEC) are not statistically significant across all three measures of fee
variables.16 Further analysis of the model with the interaction term (table 5,
panel C) reveals that the coefficients of FEE (ω1) and the summation FEE +
FEE ∗ SPEC (ω1 + ω13) are both negative and statistically significant for
all fee measures, suggesting that firms audited by both nonspecialists and
specialists report more income-decreasing accruals as fees increase.17 This
finding is consistent with both nonspecialist and specialist auditors being
either more conservative or more tolerant of income-decreasing earnings
management as fees increase.
We also compute an alternative measure for discretionary current accruals
based on a portfolio approach, as in Ashbaugh, Lafond, and Mayhew [2003].
We partition firms within each two-digit SIC code into deciles based on their
prior year’s ROA. Performance-adjusted discretionary current accruals are
16 Chung and Kallapur [2003] also examine the interaction between audit specialization
and fees on discretionary accruals. They also report insignificant results for the interaction
term.
17 In comparison, Ashbaugh, Lafond, and Mayhew [2003] find no association between non-
audit services provision and positive discretionary current accruals, and some evidence of a
negative association for negative discretionary accruals. Frankel, Johnson, and Nelson [2002]
report a significant positive (negative) association between non-audit fees and positive (nega-
tive) discretionary accruals.
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calculated as the difference between a sample firm’s discretionary current
accruals and the median discretionary current accruals for each ROA decile
excluding the sample firm. We repeat the analyses and the untabulated
results are similar to those reported in table 5.
Overall, our results document no moderating effect of auditor specializa-
tion on the association between the various fee measures and discretionary
accruals.
4.3 BENCHMARK TESTS
4.3.1. Meeting or Missing Analysts’ Forecasts. We also use firms’ propensity
to meet or avoid missing analysts’ forecasts to infer audit quality. Prior re-
search suggests that the market appears to reward firms that meet analysts’
forecasts and punish those that miss analysts’ forecasts (Bartov, Givoly, and
Hayn [2002], Kasznik and McNichols [2002], Lopez and Rees [2002]). Fol-
lowing prior studies (e.g., Frankel, Johnson, and Nelson [2002], Ashbaugh,
Lafond, and Mayhew [2003]), we compute actual earnings per share (EPS)
minus the last available median consensus analysts’ forecasts prior to the
announcement of annual earnings, with MEET equal to one for firms re-
porting an earnings surprise of zero to positive one cent, and zero other-
wise.18 Consistent with Frankel, Johnson, and Nelson [2002], we compute
MISS for firms that just fall short of meeting analysts’ consensus forecasts,
with MISS equal to one for firms that miss the forecasts by two cents, and
zero otherwise.
We run the following logistic regression model:
MEET or MISS = ϕ0 + ϕ1FEE + ϕ2TENU + ϕ3LITIG + ϕ4MB + ϕ5MV
+ ϕ6LOSS + ϕ7CFO + ϕ8FIN + ϕ9ROA + ϕ10DCA
+ ϕ11SPEC + ϕ12Y00 + ϕ13FEE*SPEC + ε (6)
where
MEET = 1 when a firm’s actual EPS minus the consensus analysts’ forecast
is within zero to one cent (both inclusive), and zero otherwise;
MISS = 1 when a firm’s actual EPS minus the consensus analysts’ forecast
falls between 0 cents (exclusive) and −2 cents (inclusive), and
zero otherwise;
ROA = returns on assets;
DCA = discretionary current accruals estimated with lagged ROA in the
cross-sectional Jones [1991] model;
All other variables are as previously defined.
18 We define the consensus analyst forecast as the median EPS forecast computed over the
set of the analysts providing forecasts for the firm. We use the most recent forecasts that are no
earlier than two months before the earnings release date. This procedure avoids the problem
of stale analyst forecasts. We use the unadjusted I/B/E/S forecasts so that we do not have
the problem of losing precision in the decimal places of the forecasts because of I/B/E/S
adjustments of prior forecasts for subsequent stock splits (Payne and Thomas [2003]). To be
consistent, we measure the actual earnings using I/B/E/S as well.
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4.3.2. Empirical Results. Table 6 reports the descriptive statistics and cor-
relation matrix for the fees and variables used in the analysts’ forecast model.
On average, 17% of the firms just meet analysts’ forecasts by one cent, and
7% of firms just miss analysts’ forecasts by two cents. The fee variables mea-
sured by LNAU and LTOT (but not PRNAU ) are significantly greater for
audit specialists than non-audit specialists.
We report the results for the logistic regression for meeting and missing
the analysts’ forecasts in panels A and B of table 7. For each independent
variable, we report the regression coefficient, followed by the Wald statistic
in parentheses, and the marginal effect (in percent) in the square brackets.
We find no association between SPEC and either MEET or MISS in mod-
els that only include SPEC but not the fee measures. In a model with fee
measures alone (without SPEC), we find that MEET is not significantly as-
sociated with all three fee variables and MISS is negatively associated with
PRNAU (but not LNAU and LTOT). In comparison, Frankel, Johnson, and
Nelson [2002] find that non-audit fees have a positive association with MEET
and a negative association with MISS, while Ashbaugh, Lafond, and Mayhew
[2003] do not test MISS and find no such association with MEET .
When we include the interaction term (FEE ∗ SPEC) in the MEET model,
the coefficient for the interaction term (φ13) for all three fee variables is not
statistically significant, inconsistent with the prediction in H1. However, for
the MISS model, the coefficient φ13 for the interaction term (FEE ∗ SPEC)
is positive and statistically significant for all the three fee variables. The sig-
nificant positive interaction term (FEE ∗ SPEC) suggests that firms audited
by audit specialists rather than nonspecialists are more likely to miss ana-
lysts’ forecasts when non-audit services increase. Analysis of the marginal
effects associated with this interaction term (reported in table 7, panel B)
shows that, depending on the fee proxy, every standard deviation change in
FEE ∗ SPEC increases the firm’s likelihood of missing the earnings bench-
mark by 1.94% to 5.06% (i.e., the likelihood increases to about 9% to 12%,
starting from a base rate of 7%). For MISS, the coefficient estimate for FEE
(φ1) is significantly negative, suggesting that firms audited by nonspecialists
are less likely to miss analysts’ forecasts as non-audit services increase. The
sum of the coefficient estimates (φ1 + φ13) for all three fee variables does not
vary significantly from zero, indicating a lack of evidence that firms audited
by specialists are likely to avoid missing analysts’ forecasts.19
Overall, the results indicate that firms that purchase more non-audit ser-
vices from nonspecialists are less likely to miss analysts’ forecasts, relative to
those that purchase more non-audit services from specialists. To the extent
that a firm’s enhanced ability to avoid missing analysts’ forecasts is achieved
19 As additional analyses, we also code the dependent variable MEET MISS to be one if a
firm’s actual EPS minus the consensus analysts’ forecast is within zero to one cent, and 0 if
a firm’s actual EPS minus the consensus analysts’ forecast is within negative two cents (see
footnote 13 of Frankel, Johnson, and Nelson [2002]). We fail to find a significant fee by
specialization interaction for this measure.
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through lower audit and financial reporting quality, these results suggest
that when an auditor’s provision of non-audit services to a firm increases,
audit quality is more likely to be impaired for nonspecialist auditors than
specialist auditors.
4.4 EARNINGS-RETURNS RELATION
4.4.1. Empirical Model. We use the ERC from earnings-returns regressions
as a proxy for investor perceptions of earnings quality. Following prior stud-
ies (e.g., Krishnan, Sami, and Zhang [2005], Francis and Ke [2006]), we mea-
sure three-day cumulative abnormal returns for days −1, 0, and 1, where day
0 is the day of the first quarterly earnings announcement after fee disclosure
in the proxy statements, where abnormal returns is defined as the difference
between a firm’s returns and CRSP value-weighted market returns.20
To ensure comparability with prior studies, we use a set of control variables
similar to those used in Francis and Ke [2006]. Specifically, we run the
following regression:
CAR = α0 + α1(UE) + α2(FEE) + α3(UE*FEE) + α4(GRW) + α5(UE*GRW)
+ α6(VOL) + α7(UE*VOL) + α8(LEV) + α9(UE*LEV) + α10(MV)
+ α11(UE*MV) + α12(LOSS) + α13(UE*LOSS) + α14(RESTR)
+ α15(UE*RESTR) + α16SPEC + α17(UE*SPEC) + α18Y00
+ α19(UE*Y00) + α20(FEE*SPEC) + α21(UE*FEE*SPEC) + ε (7)
where
CAR = three-day cumulative abnormal returns around the first quarterly
earnings announcement after the fee discourse in the proxy state-
ments;
UE = earnings surprise, measured by the difference between actual EPS
and the most recent median earnings forecast for the quarter
immediately after the disclosure of fee information in the proxy
statement, scaled by stock price at the beginning of the quarter;
both actual and forecasted EPS are from I/B/E/S detailed files;
FEE = fee metrics, LNAU , PRNAU , and LTOT , as defined earlier;
GRW = sum of the market value of equity and book value of debt scaled
by book value of assets at the end of the quarter;
VOL = standard deviation of daily stock returns over a 90-day window
ending seven days prior to the earnings announcement date;
LEV = debt-to-capital ratio at the end of the quarter;
MV = natural log of market capitalization at the end of the quarter;
20 Firms must file proxy statements with fee information to the SEC, which is typically three
to four months after the fiscal year-end. We track the date of these proxy statements indicated
in the Audit Analytics database to ensure that the fee information is available to investors when
firms make the first quarterly earnings announcements after the fiscal year-end.
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LOSS = 1 if the current quarter’s earnings is negative, and 0 otherwise;
RESTR = 1 if the special item as a percentage of total assets in the quarter
is less than or equal to −5%, and 0 otherwise;
SPEC = 1 if the auditor has the largest market share in the industry, and
0 otherwise;
Y 00 = year dummy.
4.4.2. Empirical Results. Descriptive statistics for the fee data and variables
used in the earnings-returns regression model are reported in table 8. The
mean (median) CAR is 1% (0.5%). The mean (median) earnings surprise is
0.2% (0.1%) of the stock price at the beginning of the quarter. All three fee
variables are significantly higher for the audit specialists than the non-audit
specialists.
Table 9, panel A reports the results of the impact of non-audit fees and au-
ditor specialization on the earnings-returns relation. Consistent with Balsam,
Krishnan, and Yang [2003], we find that auditor specialization (in the model
with SPEC but without FEE) is associated with a higher ERC. When we assess
the effects of fees (without SPEC), consistent with prior studies (Krishnan,
Sami, and Zhang [2005], Francis and Ke [2006]), we find that non-audit ser-
vice fees are associated with a lower ERC, indicating that investors perceive
earnings quality to be lower with high non-audit fees.21
We next include the interaction term UE ∗ FEE ∗ SPEC (α21) in the
model. Consistent with our prediction in H1, the coefficient estimate for
UE ∗ FEE ∗ SPEC is positive and statistically significant for all three fee mea-
sures, suggesting that when auditors provide non-audit services to clients,
earnings quality, and presumably audit quality, is perceived to be higher
for specialist auditors than for nonspecialist auditors. To investigate the
nature of this three-way interaction, we split the sample into two groups,
firms audited by specialist and nonspecialist auditors, and assess whether
the UE ∗ FEE interaction varies by auditor specialization. Results are shown
in table 9, panel B. The UE ∗ FEE interaction tests whether the earnings-
returns relation varies at different levels of fees. For firms audited by spe-
cialists, the coefficient estimate for UE ∗ FEE (α3) is positive and significant
at the 1% level, which is consistent with the notion that investors perceive
earnings quality and presumably audit quality to be higher as specialists pro-
vide more non-audit services to their clients. In contrast, for firms audited by
nonspecialists, the coefficient estimate for UE ∗ FEE (α3) is negative and sig-
nificant at the 1% level. This suggests that investors perceive earnings quality
to be eroded when non-audit specialists provide more non-audit services.
21 Krishnan, Sami, and Zhang [2005] find that total fees are associated with lower ERC
only in the first quarter (but not the second and third quarters) following the release of
fee information in the proxy statements. However, they find that unexpected total fees are
associated with lower ERC in the second and third quarters following the proxy releases. In
conclusion, they interpret their results as consistent with the notion of investors perceiving the
provision of non-audit services as impairing auditor independence.
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As a robustness check, we include industry dummies that interact with
earnings surprises in the ERC model to assess whether our results are driven
by industry effects (Balsam, Krishnan, and Yang [2003]). Our results remain
robust even after the inclusion of industry dummies. We also measure re-
turns over [−1,0] or [−1,1] around the quarterly announcement date, with
or without adjusting for market returns, and obtain similar results.
Overall, the evidence indicates that when auditors provide non-audit ser-
vices to clients, earnings quality, and therefore audit quality, is perceived to
be higher for specialist auditors than for nonspecialist auditors.
4.5 YEAR-BY-YEAR ANALYSES
In additional analyses, we analyze the models for each year separately.
For the going-concern opinion model, the coefficient estimate for the in-
teraction term (FEE ∗ SPEC) is positive and significant at the 10% level for
each year only for LTOT , but, inconsistent with our main findings, is not
significant in either year for LNAU and PRNAU . One possible reason is that
the power of the test is reduced when we split the sample by year. There are
649 firms in 2000, with only 33 firms receiving going-concern opinions, and
1,043 firms in 2001, with 87 firms with going-concern opinions.
For the discretionary accruals test, similar to those reported in table 5,
we do not find any statistically significant FEE ∗ SPEC interaction. For the
MEET test, the interaction term is not statistically significant for all three fee
variables, similar to our main analyses. For the MISS test, the interaction term
(FEE ∗ SPEC) is positive and statistically significant only for the year 2001, but
not 2000, for all three fee measures (whereas interaction terms for all three
fee proxies are statistically significant when pooled, as reported in the main
analyses). Finally, for the ERC test, we find that firms audited by specialists
are associated (not associated) with a higher ERC in year 2000 (2001). In
comparison, firms audited by nonspecialists are associated with a lower ERC
only in the year 2001, but not in the year 2000. In the pooled analyses, we
find that firms audited by specialists (nonspecialists) are associated with a
higher (lower) ERC.
Overall, our results are generally weaker using year-by-year data than those
found in the main analyses using pooled data, likely due to the lower power
associated with smaller sample sizes.
4.6 SIZE EFFECT
It is possible that our measures of auditor specialization and fees are
proxying for some size effect—that is, larger firms likely have more complex
operations and attract larger litigation risks, and are therefore more likely
to employ specialized auditors for their expertise and pay higher fees. In
all our analyses, we control for firm size, which somewhat alleviates this
concern. We further explore this issue here. We find that SPEC has low
correlations with firm size (between 0.04 and 0.08) and the various fee
measures (between 0.00 and 0.11); see panel B of various tables. Thus, SPEC
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has good discriminant validity from other constructs such as firm size and
fees.
On the other hand, the correlation between size and fee measures is high
(between 0.57 and 0.79), which raises the possibility that fees and firm size
are substitutes and not distinct constructs. If this is the case, it implies that our
findings of a two-way interaction between SPEC and FEE should replicate
when we replace our fee measures with firm size. On the other hand, if
they are distinct constructs, these results may not replicate. In untabulated
results, for models that exclude the fee measures but include SPEC , firm
size (using total assets as a proxy for size), and their interaction, we fail to
find significant interactions between SPEC and firm size for any of the audit
quality measures. In contrast, we find a SPEC by FEE interaction for the
going-concern, MISS, and ERC measures. These findings suggest that fees
and firm size are different constructs.
5. Conclusion
Recent studies on whether the provision of non-audit services impairs au-
ditor independence and audit quality have found mixed results, depending
on the proxy for audit quality used. We posit and provide some evidence
that the effect of non-audit fees on audit quality is conditional on auditor
industry specialization. Table 10 summarizes our primary results, and key
differences between findings in our study and those of prior studies. We find
that audit quality as measured by the increased propensity to issue going-
concern opinions, reduced propensity to avoid missing analysts’ forecasts,
and higher ERCs, is generally enhanced for firms that acquire non-audit ser-
vices from specialist auditors compared to those that acquire non-audit ser-
vices from nonspecialist auditors. We fail to detect a non-audit fee by auditor
specialization interaction for both the propensities to record higher discre-
tionary current accruals and to just meet analysts’ forecasts. Taken together,
our results provide some evidence, using going-concern opinions, propen-
sity to avoid missing analysts’ forecasts, and ERCs, that industry-specialized
auditors are more likely than nonspecialists to provide higher audit quality
when they provide non-audit services to clients. This higher audit quality
associated with industry specialists (relative to nonspecialists) when they
provide non-audit services can be attributed to their greater independence
both in fact and in appearance, and/or their greater ability to benefit from
knowledge spillovers.
Our failure to detect an interaction between non-audit service provision
and auditor specialization for discretionary accruals and the propensity to
just meet analysts’ forecasts raises questions on the measurement error as-
sociated with some of these measures (e.g., see Kinney and Libby’s [2002]
comment on the reliability of discretionary accruals) and on the sensitivity
of benchmark tests to how they are operationalized (e.g., in terms of avoid-
ing missing or just meeting analysts’ forecasts). It is also possible that the
provision of non-audit fees has no association with some proxies of audit
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quality to begin with, that there are limits to the extent auditor specializa-
tion moderates the influence of non-audit services, and/or that the relation
between auditor specialization and provision of non-audit fees is more com-
plex and involves other moderators not investigated in this study. Future
research can explore these possibilities.
In conclusion, concerns about the impairment of auditors’ independence
through the provision of non-audit services to their audit clients have led
to a series of recent actions by regulators, beginning with the requirement
for SEC registrants to disclose audit fees in their proxy statements, followed
by restrictions of certain categories of non-audit services that auditors can
provide. These measures apply to all public accounting firms and their listed
clients. Our findings suggest that not all public accounting firms are nec-
essarily tainted by the provision of non-audit services. Our results suggest
that there is some evidence consistent with industry specialist auditors re-
taining their independence both in fact and appearance even when they
provide non-audit services to their audit clients. In addition, our findings
indicate that auditor industry specialization, or more broadly speaking, au-
ditor expertise, can play an important role in mitigating the regulatory and
academic communities’ concerns about the appropriateness of accounting
firms providing non-audit services.
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